Load Oscillating Attack in Smart Grids
We consider in this work load oscillating attacks in power transmission systems. In this kind of attack, an adversary estimates the line flow sensitivity factors (LFSF) of a target line to predict the optimal load adjustment of a subset of compromised loads required to trip the targeted line. LFSF is estimated by disturbing a very small part (0.001 % to 0.005 %) of the system load. We propose an optimization problem that determines the amount of loads to be oscillated in this type of attacks. This attack does not require prior knowledge of the system parameters and is assumed to compromise a small part of the system loads therefore it is difficult to estimate what the impact on the power system would be. An emergency control algorithm is considered as a part of the mitigation method. It is shown that the proposed attacks have more impact if the adversary uses different switching attacks, fast at the beginning and slow at the middle of the attack. The propose! d attacks are demonstrated using the COSMIC simulator with the IEEE RTS 96 test system.
Co Advisor: Eduardo Cotilla-Sanchez
Co Advisor: Jinsub Kim
Committee: Ted Brekken
Committee: Thinh Nguyen
GCR: William Warnes
Friday, May 29 at 2:00pm to 4:00pmVirtual Event